Monday, March 6, 2017

HIWD 320 Final Presentation


The Somali Civil Unrest

Background

Early European explorers and writers described Somali as a geographical region occupied by people of mixed descent. According to these people, the Somalis were a mixed race of African and Arab origin. Prolonged interests into the Horn of Africa made them learn that actually, the Somalis were pure Africans in race, but with Islamic beliefs. Despite the fact that intermarriages between the Arabs and the indigenous Somali people occurred, the country remains mostly inhabited by people of the African race. Somalis are mainly homogenous despite the little presence of Bantus, Arabs, and Baravans, especially along the country’s coastline.[1]
"Portuguese Exploration Routes". Digital Image. Teaching History with 100 Objects. Accessed March 6,2017.https://www.teachinghistory100.org


The Somalis have maintained their traditional political and socioeconomic organization structure where people are organized into clans. The clans form the core political unit, and every socioeconomic and political decision is supposed to be made based on that alignment. Before the advent of colonialism, there was nothing like a single geopolitical state of Somali. These marriages of conveniences only occurred after colonialism where different clans in the Horn of Africa were forced to merge into one bureaucratic state. Therefore, Somalis have long used traditional methods of solving conflicts, including the use of traditional laws (Heers) and Islamic laws (Sharia). The fact that Somalis are largely a pastoralist community living in an arid area makes these traditional ways of conflict solving crucial. Natural resources such as pastures and water are shared according to consensuses reached by representatives of various clans occupying a single geographical area.

Effects of Colonization on Somali Unrest

"Political European Colonization Cartoon". Digital Image. April 19,2014.Accessed March 6,2016.http://hornofafrica.de
Somalia was colonized by several European powers and Ethiopia. These colonial powers divided Somalia into five regions; two colonized by the British while the remaining three were shared among France, Ethiopia, and Italy. Due to these partitions, the Somali people resisted the colonial forces differently. Sayid Muhamed Abdulle Hassan led a Somali rebellion group against the British in the Southern parts of the country while other different clan-based groups organized resistance against the French, Ethiopians, and Italians differently. From this point, the Somali people had started to see their colonial world in different perspectives, considering they were dealing with different European powers with different military abilities at the same time.[2]

After Italy was defeated in the Second World War, it could not support the additional expenses of running Somalia as its colony. Somalia was put under trusteeship for about ten years. After colonization, these parts of the country were given to Ethiopia and Kenya by the British and French forces. This, among other factors, mobilized the Somalis to fight to regain their lost regions from their neighboring countries, further straining their limited resources. Of significant note is the war between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977 over the Ogaden region, which cost the developing country its resources. Therefore, Somalia started the process of national healing on a disadvantaged note, setting the stage for further conflicts to control the remaining limited resource.[3]
"Greater Somalia"
FAH1223(Own work)[Public Domain],via Wikimedia Commonshttps://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Greater_Somalia1.jpg

In 1960, both the Northern and Southern Somalia gained independence. Despite their differences, the two regions decided to unite into a central democratic republic between 1960 and 1969. During this period, the Somali Youth League, a political outfit that had played a core role in fighting for the country’s independence, formed the major political party. Other numerous political parties represented the diversity and interests of the many clans in the region. This too added momentum to the level of conflict because most of the political parties represented the specific and selfish interests of individual clans.


Geographical Location and the Somali Unrest

Somalia is largely a desert country. Before urbanization, water and pasture were considered scarce and important natural resources in this region. The most powerful clans identified and guarded most of these natural resources. Clanism has since haunted credible leadership in Somalia, whereby civilian leaders employ nepotism in the distribution of employment opportunities and education.[4]

Somalia has two neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia. For many years, these two nations have benefitted from the unrest in the region. It is therefore in their interest that a unified Somalia Republic fails to materialize for their selfish gain.[5] Ethiopia has had a significant presence in Somalia since the pre-colonial era due to their collaboration with the colonial superpowers. Ethiopia, being a landlocked country, would benefit primarily from a disintegrated Somaliland that could allow it access to the coast. Ethiopia's trade interaction with European and Asian trading partners has little to help the situation. The Cairo and Arta conferences are good examples of how foreign meddling has played a part in prolonging the conflict.[6] The Ethiopians had a hand in convincing General Aden Abdullahi Noor and Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf to reject the peace treaty signed in Cairo.


Effect of the Cold War

           During the independence struggle, the USSR played a major role in supplying the Somali militia with weaponry to resist the British, Italian and French forces. There were two centers of power on the global stage, and the British and the French had sided with the United States. This provided the USSR with a good opportunity to destabilize the offshore interests of Allied forces countries. It provided military aid and training to its forces, which were fighting against the Ethiopians for the control of Northern Somali. The US saw an opportunity to retaliate on the USSR influence by deciding to offer Ethiopia advanced military support. The Ethiopia-US and Somali-USSR relationships during the Cold War were perfect examples of pawn states used in this conflict.[7] The Somalis, who now had adequate military support from the US and USSR, invaded Somali-occupied Ethiopian territories, triggering the 1977 war. The US had vested interests in the conflict. It over -equipped the Somalis with weaponry while forgetting that the people also needed food and
shelter.

MAXAMUD JIGRE ADAN. “Somalia VS Ethiopia war 1977”. Filmed [May 2010]. YouTube video, 04:37. Posted [May 2010]https://www.youtube.com/watch=zexThNmXyEI

           Therefore, the Somalis concentrated on the war, leading to the abandonment of other economic viable activities.[8] This led to further pressure on the limited resources. Somalia was later included in the Soviet’s communist plan, which was strengthened by Siad Barre’s coup that turned Somalia from a democratic state into a socialist state.[9] 


The fact that this region was strategically located to the southern end of the Red Sea, just across the Arab Peninsula where there were major oil fields served these two powers well in terms of controlling global politics and the sea routes, projecting power and providing advanced military aid to Middle East countries.[10] The US used this avenue to stabilize pro-Western powers in the Middle East, ensure economic stability and security of Western governments and ensure limited interference to the oil lanes by the Soviet powers. The US efforts of keeping the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean open for Israeli shipping were counter actions against a USSR side that had envisioned permanent post-colonial inclusion of this region in its communism camp.[11]

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, global polarization reduced. The US dropped any real interest in Somali, allowing the locals to remain with the advanced arms and military knowledge. Several clans formed militia group that fought other clans as well as the military regime of Siad Barre. After the US officially suspended its financial and military aid, major vulnerabilities in the government and the nation in general surfaced. A report after the war showed that most Somalia households had more US-made weapons than food.[12]

In conclusion, by taking into consideration the above explanations, it is clear that the rivalries between the European powers played a major role in the Somali unrest for years. The European forces were able to manipulate neighboring African governments such as Kenya and Ethiopia to contribute to the region’s unrest.

Kai Brown. “HIWD Final Presentation”. Filmed [March 2017]. YouTube video, 09:01. Posted [March 2017]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPx-D8VjAIM&feature=youtu.be.







                                                                      Bibliography



Cassanelli, Lee. "The opportunistic economies of the Kenya-Somali borderland in historical perspective." Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa (2010): 133-150.

Doornbos, Martin, Lionel Cliffe, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, and John Markakis. "Beyond conflict in the Horn: Prospects for peace, recovery and development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan." (1992).

Durch, William J., and Barry M. Blechman. Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order. The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992.

Gale Group. History behind the headlines: the origins of conflicts worldwide. Vol. 6. Gale Group, 2003.

King, Gerbian, and Vanessa Lawrence. "Africa, a continent in crisis: The economic and social implications of civil war and unrest among African nations." (2005).

Little, Peter D. Somalia: Economy without state. Indiana University Press, 2003.

Marchal, Roland. "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war." Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: Essays in gender relations and political reform 331 (2013).

Moore, Patrick S., Anthony A. Marfin, Lynn E. Quenemoen, Bradford D. Gessner, Daniel S. Miller, Michael J. Toole, Y. S. Ayub, and Kevin M. Sullivan. "Mortality rates in displaced and resident populations of central Somalia during 1992 famine." The Lancet 341, no. 8850 (1993): 935-938.

Razack, Sherene. Dark threats and white knights: The Somalia affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism. University of Toronto Press, 2004.



[1] Baier, Erica, I. A. Adel, and Water Scarcity. "Hope in Somalia, One Drop at A Time."

[2] Besteman, Catherine, and Lee V. Cassanelli. "Struggle for land in Southern Somalia; The war behind the war." (2000).
[3] King, Gerbian, and Vanessa Lawrence. "Africa, a continent in crisis: The economic and social implications of civil war and unrest among African nations." (2005).

[4] Moore, Patrick S., Anthony A. Marfin, Lynn E. Quenemoen, Bradford D. Gessner, Daniel S. Miller, Michael J. Toole, Y. S. Ayub, and Kevin M. Sullivan. "Mortality rates in displaced and resident populations of central Somalia during 1992 famine." The Lancet 341, no. 8850 (1993): 935-938.
[5] Cassanelli, Lee. "The opportunistic economies of the Kenya-Somali borderland in historical perspective." Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn of Africa (2010): 133-150.
[6] Razack, Sherene. Dark threats and white knights: The Somalia affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism. University of Toronto Press, 2004.

[7] Marchal, Roland. "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war." Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: Essays in gender relations and political reform 331 (2013).
[8] Durch, William J., and Barry M. Blechman. Keeping the Peace: The United Nations in the Emerging World Order. The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1992.
[9] Marchal, Roland. "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war." Islam in Africa South of the Sahara: Essays in gender relations and political reform 331 (2013).
[10] Gale Group. History behind the headlines: the origins of conflicts worldwide. Vol. 6. Gale Group, 2003.

[11] Doornbos, Martin, Lionel Cliffe, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, and John Markakis. "Beyond conflict in the Horn: Prospects for peace, recovery and development in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan." (1992).
[12] Little, Peter D. Somalia: Economy without state. Indiana University Press, 2003.

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